CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CORPORATE PERFORMANCE: A COMPARISON OF GERMANY, JAPAN, AND THE U.S.

Contrary to assertions that there are fundamental differences in the efficiency of "market-based" and "relationship-oriented" corporate governance systems, this article presents evidence that the German, Japanese, and American systems appear about equally effective in disciplining poor managerial performance. For example, both the job security and total compensation of German and Japanese managers appear to be tied to stock performance and current cash flows- measures that some would refer to as "short-term"-to roughly the same extent as those of U.S. managers. Furthermore, the punishments and rewards for German and Japanese managers are not more sensitive to sales growth-a measure some would refer to as "long-term"-than those of their U.S. counterparts.
But, if there is no clear difference between the three governance systems in responding to poor stock and earnings performance, there is one important difference: the U.S. system is more effective than the German and Japanese systems in discouraging successful companies from overinvest-ing. One reason for this is the fact that U.S. managers hold much larger equity positions than managers in Japan and Germany. Another important factor, however, is the difficulty faced by Japanese companies in returning capital to their shareholders. Dividends are minimal; and, until 1995, it was illegal for a Japanese company to repurchase its stock.     

Toward a Parsimonious Definition of Traditional and Electronic Mass Customization

Although mass customization, a term introduced by Davis (1987) to describe the oxymoron of mass producing customized products, has been part of research for more than a decade, literature has not come up with a commonly accepted definition of this term up to now. The present article attempts to close this gap by proposing a definition of traditional and electronic mass customization, which is based on answering three research questions. First, for which kind of customized goods (products versus services) is mass customization applicable at all? Second, at which step of the value creation process must the customer be given the chance to customize his or her good to be able to speak of mass customization? And finally, which prerequisites in terms of production cost and monetary price need to be fulfilled when comparing mass‐customized with mass‐produced goods? Using an extensive analysis of extant literature in the field, the authors develop two definitions of traditional mass customization, a working and a visionary one, as well as one for electronic mass customization, stating how new opportunities arising from advances in communication and information technology can influence this concept.     

How to solve the cost crisis in health care

U.S. health care costs currently exceed 17% of GDP and continue to rise. One fundamental reason that providers are unable to reverse the trend is that they don't understand what it costs to deliver patient care or how those costs compare with outcomes. To put it bluntly, few health care providers measure the actual costs for treating a given patient with a given medical condition over a full cycle of care, or compare the costs they incur with the outcomes they achieve. What isn't measured cannot be managed or improved, and this is all too true in health care, where poor costing systems mean that effective and efficient providers go unrewarded, and inefficient ones have little incentive to improve. But all this can be remedied by exploring the concept of value in health care and carefully measuring costs. This article describes a new way to analyze costs that uses patients and their conditions--not organizational units or narrow diagnostic treatment groups--as the fundamental unit of analysis for measuring costs and outcomes. The new approach, called time-driven activity-cased costing, is currently being implemented in pilots at the Head and Neck Center at MD Anderson, the Cleft Lip and Palate Program at Children's Hospital in Boston, and units performing knee replacements at Sch?n Klinik in Germany and Brigham & Women's Hospital in Boston. As providers and payors better understand costs, they will be positioned to achieve a true "bending of the cost curve" from within the system, not in response to top-down mandates. Accurate costing also unlocks a whole cascade of opportunities, such as process improvement, better organization of care, and new reimbursement approaches that will accelerate the pace of innovation and value creation.     

Transforming the back office with a single keystroke

Intelligent data capture is an application that can provide electronic access to data contained in any type of document, including clinical records and financial documents, thereby reducing or eliminating the need for manual data entry. Before implementing this technology, however, healthcare leaders should: Evaluate technology in the context of a business case to ensure a measurable ROI. Communicate with employees throughout the process so they are prepared for and embrace the inevitable changes that will come with automation. Implement the solution in phases, focusing on those document types that can deliver for a safer, less disruptive approach. Achieve maximum benefit to the organization by reengineering business processes to fully leverage technology rather than simply automating existing manual processes.     

Morgan Stanley Roundtable on The State of Global Private Equity

In this discussion led by Alan Jones, Morgan Stanley's head of Global Private Equity, the University of Chicago's Steve Kaplan begins by surveying 25 years of academic research on private equity. Starting with Kaplan's own Ph.D. dissertation on leveraged buyouts during the 1980s, finance academics have provided a large and growing body of studies documenting the ability of private equity firms to make “sustainable” (that is, maintained over a three‐ or four‐year period) improvements in the operating performance of their portfolio companies, whether operating abroad or in the U.S. Even more impressive, the findings of Kaplan's new study (with Tim Jenkinson of Oxford and Bob Harris of the University of Virginia) suggest that these improvements have been large enough to enable PE funds raised between 1990 and 2008 to deliver returns to their limited partners that have averaged 300 to 400 basis points higher per year than the returns to the S&P 500. And given the “persistence” of PE fund returns—the tendency of the funds of the same PE firms to show up in the top quartile of performers year after year—that Kaplan has documented in earlier work, the performance of private equity seems notably different from that of mutual funds and hedge funds, where there has been little if any consistency in the returns provided by the top performers. Following Kaplan's overview of the research, four representatives of today's leading private equity firms explore questions like the following:

• ? How do the best PE firms, after paying premiums to acquire their portfolio companies and collecting large management fees, provide such consistently high returns to their limited partners?
• ? How did PE portfolio companies perform during the last recession, when many popular business publications were predicting the death of private equity—and what, if anything, does that tell us about how private equity adds value?
• ? What can PE firms do to avoid, or at least limit the damage from, the overpricing and overleveraging that tend to occur near the end of the boom‐and‐bust cycle that appears to be a permanent feature of private equity?

As Jones notes in his opening comments, the practitioners' answers to such questions “should help investors distinguish between the alpha that the firms represented at this table have generated through active management from the ‘closet beta’ that critics say results when private equity firms simply create what amounts to a levered bet on the public equity markets.”     

What to ask the person in the mirror

Every leader gets off track from time to time. But as leaders rise through the ranks, they have fewer and fewer opportunities for honest and direct feedback. Their bosses are no longer monitoring their actions, and by the time management missteps have a negative impact on business results, it's usually too late to make course corrections that will set things right. Therefore, it is wise to go through a self-assessment, to periodically step back from the bustle of running a business and ask some key questions of yourself. Author Robert S. Kaplan, who during his 22-year career at Goldman Sachs chaired the firm's senior leadership training efforts and cochaired its partnership committee, identifies seven areas for self-reflection: vision and priorities, managing time, feedback, succession planning, evaluation and alignment, leading under pressure, and staying true to yourself. The author sets out a series of questions in each of the areas, illustrating the impact of self-assessment through vivid accounts of real executives. Although the questions sound simple, people are often shocked-even horrified- by their own answers. Executives are aware that they should be focusing on their most important priorities, for instance, but without stepping back to reflect, few actually know where they are allocating their time. Kaplan advocates writing down what you do every working hour for a week and checking how well your actions match up with your intentions. As for feedback, managers should ask themselves whether they're getting truthful evaluations from their subordinates. (In all likelihood, they aren't). It takes time and discipline to persuade your employees to tell you about your failings.     

Why banks should keep secrets

Summary. We show that it is sometimes efficient for a bank to commit to a policy that keeps information about its risky assets private. Our model, based upon Diamond-Dybvig (1983), has the feature that banks acquire information about their risky assets before depositors acquire it. A bank has the option of using contracts where the middle-period return on deposits is contingent on this information, but by doing so it must also reveal the information. We derive the conditions on depositors preferences and banking technology for which a bank would prefer to keep information secret even though it must then use a non-contingent deposit contract.Received: 5 November 2002, Revised: 19 December 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D8, G21, G28.I would like to thank an anonymous referee, Sudipto Bhattacharya, Ed Green, Chandra Kanodia, Andy McLennan, Arijit Mukherji, Bradley Ruffle, Neil Wallace, Warren Weber, and especially Nobu Kiyotaki for useful comments and suggestions.